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Notes From the Eye of the Storm
by Gene R. Shreve*
When the Currie theorists redecided a series of famous cases in the
symposium program, they reflected little of the confusion and tumult
that grips conflicts scholarship. The participants appeared to have few
doubts about the soundness of Brainerd Currie's governmental interest
analysis.' They tended merely to differ on whether particular case
results are faithful to Currie's approach. Such concord was by happen-
stance rather than design. Lea Brilmayer (a foe of interest analysis2)
and Larry Kramer (an interest analysis revisionist3) would have
presented more contrasting views had they accepted invitations to
appear. Currie's true believers on the panel were left to describe (with
an understandable lack of conviction) the attacks of others on the great
man's work.
Yet the fact that discussion was rather like-minded need not prevent
us from enjoying the transcript. Nor should the fact that Brainerd
Currie's choice-of-law package has never been adopted by an American
court and probably never will be. Informed and thoughtful discussion
among the program participants helps us to understand a little better
* Richard S. Melvin Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at
Bloomington. University of Oklahoma (A.B., 1965); Harvard Law School (LL.B., 1968;
LL.M., 1975).
1. For the particulars of Currie's approach, see BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter CURRIE, ESSAYS]; Brainerd Currie, The
Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754 (1963); Herma H. Kay, A
Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES COURS 19 (1989).
2. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78
MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980); Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985).
3. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U.




what Currie was driving at. That matters because Currie's ideas are
still important to conflicts thinking.4
Besides, judging from some of the contemporary conflicts writing to be
found elsewhere, we could have done a great deal worse. The program
panelists know their subject inside out and are in conflicts for the long
haul. Therefore, we encounter none of the naivetd and arrogance that
afflicts some conflicts writing by those who reason from their immediate
failure to understand conflicts law and theory and believe that the
subject is not understandable, who venture briefly into the conflicts
literature to denounce the subject and to ridicule serious conflicts
scholars. At the same time, the symposium panelists usually managed
to avoid some of the problems that often plague conflicts insiders. That
is, we find in the transcript a minimum of impenetrable analysis, harsh
dismissal of opposing views, and hollow claims of victory.
Serene in the turbulent field of conflict of laws, the symposium
program was like the quiet encountered in the eye of a hurricane. The
balance of this Essay attempts to place Currie's symposium in context;
it considers the storm of conflicts debate and how it affects our under-
standing of the subject.
Modern conflicts law has had a prolonged adolescence. For about fifty
years, it has pursued multiple, perhaps competing objectives in theory,
and has often appeared uncertain in application. This has prompted
innumerable debates over what conflicts law is or should be. Some
commentators view the varied, contingent character of choice of law as
actually beneficial. Others disagree, believing conflicts law is badly
flawed. These critics disagree among themselves about how to reform
conflicts law, or whether it is even worth saving. Reform-minded critics
offer competing proposals for revamping the subject. More pessimistic
critics simply reject conflicts law. They are primarily interested in ways
to confine or marginalize the subject.
To find the last decisive and intelligible development in the history of
conflicts theory, we must go back to the collapse of the lex loci delicti
approach to choice of law. Lex loci was a strong statement of multilater-
alism-that is, a body of rules designed to be administered throughout
a community ofjurisdictions.5 The object was to secure the same choice-
4. Currie's ideas were discussed at length in an earlier symposium, Interest Analysis
in Conflict of Laws: An Inquiry into Fundamentals with a Side Glance at Products
Liability, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 457 (1985) (contributions by P. John Kozyris, Lea Brilmayer,
Robert A. Sedler, Russell J. Weintraub, Friedrich K. Juenger, Dimitrios Evrigenis, Donald
H. Berman, George A. Zaphiriou, Gene R. Shreve, William V. Luneburg, and Symeon
Symeonides).
5. For more on multilateralism in choice of law, see FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF
LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 13-14 (1993); Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the
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of-law result for a particular kind of case, wherever that case might be
tried. Strong in the nineteenth century," the approach reached its
zenith through adoption in 1934 of the American Law Institute's original
Restatement of the Law of Conflicts.7 The Restatement was a series of
jurisdiction-selecting rules derived from the geographical location of an
event common to a particular type of case (e.g., the law of the place of
contracting governs issues of contract validity).
Even before adoption of the original Restatement, writers had begun
to question both the theoretical underpinnings of lex loci delictis and its
reliability in operation. Judicial rejections of the original Restatement
began later and were widespread by 1971, when the ALI backed away
from lex loci through publication of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts.
Brainerd Currie may have been the critic most responsible for this
conflicts revolution. In his own choice-of-law approach (exercised at
length by the symposium panelists), Currie perfected the concept of
interest analysis.
Just as lex loci delicti is a species of multilateralism, interest analysis
represents unilateralism. That is to say, interest analysts measure a
law's applicability not by jurisdiction-selecting rules but by asking
whether the case at hand is one the law is designed to govern.' If so,
the sovereign creating that law may be said to be "interested" in having
Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271, 282-84 (1996).
6. The most influential work was JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1834), described in Kurt H. Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribution to American
Conflicts Law: A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230 (1961); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws--One Hundred Years After, 48 HARv. L. REV. 15
(1934).
7. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1934). Joseph H. Beale, the first great
academic theorist, guided the original conflicts Restatement through the American Law
Institute. Descriptions of Beale's views and his role in shaping the Restatement appear in
HERBERT F. GOODRICH, YIELDING PLACE TO NEW: REST VERSUS MOTION IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1950).
8. For example, several scholars, working prior to or at the same time as Currie wrote,
captured something of Currie's approach by questioning the indifference of lex loci delicti
to the purposes of the laws in conflict. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice
of Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 192-93, 197-200 (1933); Elliott E. Cheatham,
American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361,380-81
(1945); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736, 750-51 (1924).
9. For more on unilateralism in choice of law, see Juenger, supra note 5, at 14, 33-34;
Shreve, supra note 5, at 284-86. Cf Gene R. Shreve, The Odds Against Teaching Conflicts,
27 U. TOL. L. REV. 587, 592 n.10 (1996) ("In a unilateral approach, the sovereign
jurisdiction entertaining the particular case may sacrifice the transjurisdictional goals of
comity, reciprocity, and uniformity in order to recognize local interests and advance them
by the decision.").
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it applied. This is an inquiry about the spatial reach of substantive
law-will the policies accounting for the existence of that law be
sacrificed if it yields to conflicting law? The contact, or geographical
feature, of a case most likely to generate interest is the domicile of the
parties. Thus, interest analysis is sometimes called a personal law
approach ° (lex loci is, correspondingly, a territorial approach).
Currie divided cases into those involving false conflicts (only one
sovereign interested), true conflicts (two sovereigns interested), and
unprovided-for cases (neither sovereign interested).12
For all his influence, Currie was not a consensus builder. Among the
controversial features in his approach were his relative indifference to
party expectations in choice of law, his refusal to compare intensities of
interests in true-conflict cases, his refusal to permit coriflicts judges to
be influenced by their substantive preferences, and his insistence that
the interested forum always apply its own law. Currie's particular views
induced attack by opponents of interest analysis across a wide front, and
they prompted many other interest analysts to distance themselves from
Currie.
The latter employ interest analysis in ways Currie and his followers
would regard as revisionist. Some reject Currie's teaching that the
interested forum must apply its own law. They maintain instead that
interest analysis can support a forum-neutral balancing approach to
choice of law.13 Similarly, some who value interest analysis believe
that it can be consolidated with choice-of-law policies differing from
Currie's, like territorialism and substantivism (the policy that conflicts
judges, whenever possible, should apply the best available substantive
law4 ), to form an eclectic choice-of-law approach. 5
10. Friedrich K Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 10-12 (1984).
11. Juenger, supra note 5, at 91.
12. Illustrated explanations of the three categories appear in William M. Richman,
Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding of Interest Analysis, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
317 (1982).
13. See, e.g., David E. Seidelson, Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems Through Interest
Analysis in Personal Injury Actions: A Suggested Order of Priority Among Competing State
Interests and Among Available Techniques for Weighing Those Interests, 30 DUQ. L. REV.
869 (1992); Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws and
the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 493 (1985).
14. For more on substantivism in choice of law, see Juenger, supra note 5, at 165-73;
Shreve, supra note 5, at 282.
15. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966) (combining multilateralism, unilateralism, a concern for party
expectations, and substantivism in a single choice-of-law approach); Elliott E. Cheatham
& Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLuM. L. REV. 959 (1952)
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From a different angle, other scholars attack the very concept of
interest analysis."6 Questions raised by their arguments include
whether it is possible consistently to determine the intended reach of
substantive rules, whether interest analysis has the structure and
stability necessary in a choice-of-law approach, and whether interest
analysis is not an open door to local favoritism and forum shopping in
choice of law.
Interest analysts do not really deny that the technique can be a means
for judges to give preferential treatment to local litigants under local
law. Rather, they differ with opponents of interest analysis over the
importance of, and answers to, a number of questions: Is not at least a
small amount of local favoritism inevitable in choice of law, given the
federal, rather than unitary, character of government in the United
States? How much local favoritism is excessive? How much excessive
forum favoritism actually occurs in American choice of law? Would
excessive forum favoritism diminish significantly if courts did not employ
interest analysis?
Opponents of interest analysis also tend to be critical of the formalistic
regime of lex loci delicti that preceded it. Interest analysts use this to
set up the challenge: Do the critics really have a different and better
alternative of their own to offer? 7 Some interest analysts suggest that
no third option exists, that options are limited to interest analysis or
some form of territorial rules, and that to choose the latter is to return
to the discredited past.'s
Both differences among interest analysts and those between the
multilateral and unilateral wings of the conflicts community became
intractable years ago. So did differences over the legitimacy of
substantivism in choice of law.'9 Thus, our conflicts literature has
(combining multilateralism, unilateralism, and a concern for party expectations).
16. See, e.g., P. John Kozyris, Postscript: Interest Analysis Facing Its Critics-And,
Incidentally, What Should Be Done About Choice of Law for Products Liability? 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 569 (1985); Brilmayer, supra note 2; Juenger, supra note 5; Maurice Rosenberg,
Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 464 (1967); Aaron
D. Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV.
104 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its "New Critics", 36
AM. J. COM. L. 681, 684-89 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in
Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 133 (1989).
19. The debate concerns whether or how the choice-of-law process should be
manipulated to secure particular substantive results. Compare Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass
Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105 (1989); Leflar, supra note 15;
Willis L.M. Reese, Substantive Policies and Choice of Law, 2 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1986);
Arthur T. Von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and
1997] 827
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become not only fractious but a little stale. This may explain two
further developments.
First, several scholars have written massive articles attempting to
reconceptualize the subject.2" These exercises in conflicts metatheory
are erudite and highly ambitious. But they are also abstruse, conten-
tious, and virtually impossible to convert into practice or to assimilate
into a more catholic understanding of conflicts theory. To be fair, each
author faced profound difficulties perhaps inherent in any contemporary
attempt to reconceptualize American conflicts law. For as confused and
controversial as conflicts law always has been, the subject became far
more difficult after the collapse of lex loci delicti. "More recently,"
acknowledges one metatheorist, "choice of law has sometimes resembled
the law's psychiatric ward. It is a place of odd fixations and schizo-
phrenic visions."2  There is now in our conflicts literature such a
disparate, often contradictory, accretion of policies, rules, systems, catch-
phrases, diagnoses, and proposed cures that it seems almost impossible
for theorists now writing to demonstrate with complete success how their
ideas are new, helpful, or even intelligible.
This may be why the role of conflicts scholarship in judicial opinions
seems to be diminishing and why most new discussion about conflicts
theory seems confined to a small, if respected, academic circle. Through
the ages of Story, Beale, and Currie, American conflicts law took much
of its shape and energy from legal scholarship. Today's metatheorists
are the Curries of our age. If they exert significantly less influence on
courts than their predecessors, does that bode ill for the future? How
much hope exists for clarity, coherence, and reform in conflicts theory?
Seeing very little hope, a final group of commentators urges dissolu-
tion of much or all of conflicts law as a common-law institution.
Through a variety of proposals, most of these critics would either absorb
conflicts law into different parts of the Constitution22 or into federal
Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARv. L. REV. 347 (1974)
(endorsing various forms and degrees of substantivism) with Hans W. Baade, The Case of
the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 150, 165-66 (1973);
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); David
F. Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 131 REcUEIL DES COURS
75, 175 (1970); CURRIE, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 104-05; Harold L. Korn, The Choice-Of-
Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 958 (1983) (attacking substantivism).
20. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277
(1989); Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191
(1987); Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1989).
21. Perry Dane, Conflict of Laws, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 209-20 (D. Patterson ed., 1996).
22. See, e.g., John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own,
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a
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statutes. 23  One alienated observer has gone further, suggesting that
conflicts law is inconsequential as well as incoherent, and thus can
simply be ignored. 24
'This is the storm over choice of law that lies beyond the placid
confines of the program transcript. It has proven impossible for me to
perform the task of this Essay, to place Currie's symposium in context,
without casting doubt over the entire academic enterprise of conflicts
theory. What lies ahead? Perhaps one of two possibilities.
First, the malaise that seems to afflict conflicts scholarship may prove
incurable. The failure of the commentators to follow up their defeat of
lex loci delicti with any significant consensus weighs heavier with the
passage of time. The thirty-five years since Currie's path-breaking work
should have-enabled the conflicts academy to progress in the process of
search, deliberation, and refinement leading to a new tradition of
conflicts jurisprudence. There is reason to wonder whether the academy
has succeeded, or whether it has instead foundered in endless, self-
perpetuating debate over the nature and value of multilateralism,
unilateralism, substantivism, and the like. There is also reason to
wonder whether, in its weakened state, the theoretical branch of
conflicts scholarship can withstand attacks from opposite directions by
the metatheorists and the conflicts marginalists. Will it simply begin to
disappear?
The second possibility is that some kind of renaissance in the conflicts
literature will occur. It is unclear how conflicts scholars will find their
way out of the wilderness that they have created and become of greater
help to each other and-as important-to the bench and bar. But it
might be useful for commentators to spend more time studying the
actual work of judges and less time talking down to them.2' The object
is not to achieve in conflicts theory a level of accord comparable to that
Limitation on State Choice-of.Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971); Douglas Laycock,
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice
of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination,
Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987); Peter D. Isakoff,
Unconstitutional Discrimination in Choice of Law, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (1977).
23. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991); Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law
Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REV. LITIG. 309 (1991).
24. Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 949 (1994).
25. Encouraging in this regard is a forthcoming symposium in the Maryland Law
Review on the work of the courts under the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts (contributions
by Patrick J. Borchers, William L. Reynolds, William M. Richman, Symeon C. Symeonides,
Louise Weinberg, and Russell J. Weintraub).
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reflected in the symposium transcript. Such would be impossible and,
given the difficulty of the subject, not entirely healthy. Yet it is time to
consider whether we as conflicts scholars have begun to mistake
disagreement for discourse. Certainly, the fervor and complexity of
academic debate about choice of law is no longer proof that the debate
matters to anyone but the participants. Perhaps we need to reacquaint
ourselves with the shared concerns that make possible a community of
conflicts scholars.
